Independent and cutting-edge analysis on global affairs
DOI: 10.58867/LYNG9600

Prediction is a fool's errand, but theories of International Relations help us generate future possibilities. While many argue that Structural Realism (SR) is better left in the trash, its assumptions provide useful tools to explain contemporary international politics. Power politics might best explain the future of the international system. The BRICS conglomerate was created to balance against the power of the United States. American power has long dominated the international system since the Soviet Union’s collapse. The BRICS, along with its international banking institutions, seeks to create a parallel international economic and political system with its own rules and regulations.[1] The intention to create a BRICS currency is the most recent development.[2] The new currency would destroy the monopoly enjoyed by the USD as the world’s reserve currency ensuring the end of American hegemony.[3] This paper will place these issues on the broader context of power politics best explained by the dynamics of SR.

This paper applies the assumptions of SR to the challenges posed by BRICS to American hegemony. As China continues to rise (albeit not without challenges), it will use economic means to increase its power position relative to the United States. A united and expanding BRICS is the vehicle for international systemic change as revisionist states, particularly China and Russia, pool power to enhance their power position against American hegemony. Relative power is at the center of this challenge. As the BRICS closes the relative power gap, the international system will become more balanced. It is possible to argue that a united BRICS will displace the American international order. Said differently, SR’s focus on relative power will help scholars prepare for significant changes in the international system, predicting the future of the BRICS and the international order. This paper will outline the assumptions of SR and define relative power to indicate the nature of the international system and the continued expansion of BRICS as a driving force of international politics in the 21st century.     

 

Structural Realism and Relative Power Defined

The international system incentivizes security competition due to the anarchical structure and its interacting states defined by power, primarily military power.[4] Economic power is also central as economic power can be translated to military power.[5] Their power or lack of it hence defines states. The unequal distribution of power across states is referred to as relative power.[6] Waltz states that power is by no means precise but can only be estimated by comparing its relative distribution across state actors. Since power is zero-sum, states pursue interests to increase their relative power positions. Relative power is an integral part of the international system as power is needed to secure the state's interests from competitors.[7] Interests are defined in relative power as “the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state concerning other sovereign states comprising the external environment.”[8] States are constantly sizing and comparing power differentials across the international system.[9] As a result, relative power is not evenly distributed across actors due to the zero-sum nature of the international structure of anarchy. 

This structure drives power-seeking security behavior. States seek security through power to survive as independent political units. Hence, the international system reshapes the distribution of capabilities across states as less powerful states may bandwagon with the threat or ally themselves with other states to survive. Some states will be more powerful than others because of the zero-sum and conflictual nature of international relations. Imbalances drive security-behavior as rival states seek to balance the system to attain security. This dynamic was clear after the fall of the Soviet Union and the ensuing American unipolar system. Russia clearly expressed its concerns in the Primakov doctrine and hoped to restore an international bipolar balance of power. These very concerns are the driving force of the BRICS and will be explained next. 

 

The Primakov Doctrine and BRICS: Bipolar Ambitions

Any power imbalance in the international system generates competition as states seek security.[10] Since relative power is not evenly distributed across actors due to the zero-sum nature of the international structure of anarchy, states struggle to concentrate power to themselves whether through military investment or through alliances.  Stephen Walt defines alliances as a “formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”[11]Cooperation is determined by the size and scope of threat that drives alliance members together. While the BRICS is not a security alliance, it has similar designs as an economic conglomerate. It is a type of external balancing due to its international political aim. The cognitive reasoning is similar to the Russian Post-Cold War motivation of returning to a bipolar world.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia expressed a deep insecurity driven by NATO expansion into Eastern Europe.[12] The Primakov doctrine is an external balancing effort that seeks to destroy American hegemony to guarantee Russian security. There are five major points based on the independence of Russia, bolstered by cooperation with another major power: China: 

  1. Russia is an indispensable actor in global politics, pursuing an independent foreign policy;
  2. Russia’s foreign policy is surmised within a broad vision of a multipolar world managed by a group of nations;
  3. Acceptance of Russia’s primacy in the post-Soviet space and in Eurasia is fundamental to all diplomatic overtures to the nation;
  4. Russia is fundamentally opposed to any expansion of NATO; and
  5. Partnership with China forms a cornerstone of Russia’s foreign policy.[13]

These five points make it clear that Russia rejects American hegemony as a threat to itself. By pooling power resources with China in point 5, points 1-3 become a reality. This same reasoning explains the rise and expansion of BRICS. China and Russia cannot balance against or challenge American hegemony alone. By increasing membership to other states and increasing economic ties with other major states in the international system (Brazil, India, South Africa, and more recently Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, and a large number of other possibilities in the future), Russia and China have a greater change of supplanting American unipolarity. The anarchical international system generates this behavior, as power drives threat. All states compete for interests in terms of power necessary for survival as independent political units.[14] The anarchical structure forces self-help behaviors where states must survive through power. States are ranked from greatest to weakest based on an estimation of power. Great powers balance against other great powers to protect interests, creating the international order.[15]

While BRICS may not be a military alliance, it is an economic-political grouping that seeks economic-political influence independent of the United States and its hegemonic system. The aim of BRICS is to create a competing economic bloc challenging the U.S. liberal order. Alone, these states cannot challenge the United States. With enough coordination and cooperation, the BRICS may be able to balance against U.S. hegemony creating a serious systemic challenge. Acting together, relatively weaker states can impact international political outcomes by leveraging their collective power and influence. This redistribution is occurring now with China's rise and Russia's resurgence. This distinction becomes clear as the international system changes from unipolarity to multipolarity and as great power competition increases.[16] We will begin to see them more as China rises. The United States and China may begin to encourage or reward other states to bandwagon to pursue their own survival interests as independent units.[17]

The power-seeking behavior described above is a zero-sum game as threatened states undermine an opponent’s power to bolster their own “because one state’s gain in power is another state’s loss.”[18] The BRICS expansion signals a loss of power for American hegemony; as the bloc grows, the American decline continues. Thus, power is not unit specific but is a systems-based concept. Hence, when we think of major international political changes, we must focus on the concentration of power relative to other centers of power. American hegemony is not just the United States, but its partners and allies across the international system like the European Union and Japan. The BRICS challenge is another manifestation of the concentration of power. States may increase this power by increasing investment in their militaries and, more important for this paper, through alliances. 

As BRICS expands, the more power it will accrue. The recent increase in membership, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia in 2024 is an interesting development. This might only be the beginning as other states like Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Palestine, Senegal, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam have all applied.[19] Other states, like Afghanistan, Angola, Comoros, DR Congo, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Myanmar, Nicaragua, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Türkiye, Somalia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, are also seeking membership.[20] These sizable economies will increase the purchasing power of the bloc. This is significant if we consider the centrality of the US Dollar (USD) to American hegemony. If a BRICS currency is developed, states, including non-BRIC member states, may be forced to sell USD and adopt the BRICS currency. This will greatly weaken the political power of the United States and cause economic disorder. Hence, the more powerful BRICS becomes, the more of a challenge it will be to American hegemony. The future of the BRICS seems bright, but that depends on its ability to stay together. 

Expanding BRICS power-seeking behavior is for survival within the anarchical structure long dominated by American power. Hence, the future of the BRICS might best be explained by SR as BRICS exists to revise the international order. Waltz refers to power within the international systems as being spread across actors as a distribution of capabilities. States are thus categorized by their power differences, that is one state’s power relative to other states in the international system. The behavior of more powerful states threatens weaker states. Generally, all states, great, weak, and middle, seek power to survive as independent actors. Since no state alone can challenge the hegemony of the United States, it is essential that BRICS states create the infrastructure to increase membership and project economic power to continue to balance against the United States.

SR sees power as central to international politics. Power is needed to compel state actors to shape their behavior. If the structure is truly to become bipolar, then China, Russia, and other revisionist states must pool their resources under the BRICS banner. The United States has long been the most powerful actor in the world. While it is declining in power, no other actor has power equal to it. The more power becomes balanced, the more we can expect the international structure to change, and the tumultuous international politics will become. BRICS now wield significant economic and political power and potential and can, for now, navigate the international system confidently with little reliance on the United States to achieve international political goals.

 

Conclusions

A simple sentence might summarize international politics: great powers rise and fall. Power ebbs and flows in the anarchical international system. One cannot expect American hegemony to last forever. The United Kingdom once dominated the globe and its oceans. It is now a middle power along with France (a former continental giant under Napoleon Bonaparte). The middle powers of today could be the great powers of tomorrow. Russia was a weak state after the collapse of the Soviet Union but now is relatively more powerful. Similarly, the United States and Imperial Germany arguably started as weak, divided, and developing states. These states grew into middle powers and then great powers. German power collapsed after World War II. China in the 1970s was relatively weaker when compared to the United States and the Soviet Union back then. During the 1980s, China began to open up to the rest of the world and increased in wealth and economic power over forty years. Today, China is a serious player in world politics even though it is undergoing some serious economic, environmental, demographic and social challenges.[21] Still, China is a major leader of BRICS and seeks to alter American hegemony. This explains why we must always expect state competition for power. Russia also possesses this drive and it’s Ukraine War (2022) is an ongoing effort to alter the international status quo. The BRICS is a manifestation of a power struggle. Since states compete for power given the anarchical international structure, they must resort to self-help, undermining competitors to secure survival interests. The BRICS will continue to increase in size and scope. As a result. the international system transforms as power is distributed and redistributed. As more members join, the more powerful it will become. Since power is zero-sum, we can expect the continued decline of the United States. 

 

[1] Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means, 74.

[2] Ahmed Sule, ‘Common Currency for BRICS?’, New York Times, 29 April 2011, A14.

[3] Barry Eichengreen, ‘Bretton Woods after 50’, Review of Political Economy 33/4 (2021), 555.

[4] Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Waveland Press, 2010), 79, 91

[5] See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981; Michael Beckley, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), 53.

[6] Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 198

[7] Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security.”

[8] D. Nuechterlein, “National interests and foreign policy: A conceptual framework for analysis and decision-making” British Journal of International Studies 2, 3: 247

[9] Waltz, Theory of International Politics.

[10] Waltz, K. N. (1990). “Realist thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs, 44(1), 21–37.

[11] Stephen S. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 1.

[12] A. Franekova, “Uneasy expansion: NATO and Russia” Harvard International Review, 24(3), (2002): 10-11.

[13] S. Kainikara, “Russia’s Return To The World Stage: The Primakov Doctrine – Analysis.” Eurasian Review, 5 November 2019. https://www.eurasiareview.com/05112019-russias-return-to-the-world-stage-the-primakov-doctrine-analysis

[14] Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations; Waltz, Theory of International Politics.

[15] Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics.

[16] Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

[17] Renato G Flôres Jr., The World Corona Changed: US, China and Middle Powers in the New International Order (Routledge, 2023), https://www.routledge.com/The-World-Corona-Changed-US-China-and-Middle-Powers-in-the-New-International/Jr/p/book/9780367763855; Patrick James, Realism and International Relations: A Graphic Turn Toward Scientific Progress (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2022)

[18] John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W.W. Norton, 2001), 34

[19] V. Dsousa “25 New Countries Ready To Join BRICS in 2024” Watcher Guru, 2 January 2024. https://watcher.guru/news/25-new-countries-ready-to-join-brics-in-2024

[20] M. Lu, “Visualizing the BRICS Expansion in 4 Charts” Visual Capitalist, 24 August 2023. https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-the-brics-expansion-in-4-charts/

[21] See Meng, X. (2023). The People’s Republic of China’s 40-year demographic dividend and labor supply: The quantity myth. Asian Development Review, 40(2), 111-144, Yang, W., Zhang, Z., Wang, Y., Deng, P., & Guo, L. (2022). Impact of China’s provincial government debt on economic growth and sustainable development. Sustainability (Basel, Switzerland), 14(3), 1474; and An, Y., & Zhang, L. (2023). The thirst for power: The impacts of water availability on electricity generation in china. The Energy Journal (Cambridge, Mass.), 44(2), 205-240.

CONTRIBUTOR
Hanna Kassab
Hanna Kassab

Hanna Kassab is an Assistant Professor for Security Studies (2022-present) at East Carolina University Department of Political Science.

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