10.58867/YCUR5426
One year ago, in a piece titled “Armenian–Azerbaijani rapprochement: Facing a hurdle,” I concluded that Armenia is stuck between myth and reality and has to move from myths related to ‘imagined communities’ defined by kinship and history to new, pragmatic relations with its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Türkiye.[1] Today, despite some sporadic attempts by the Pashinyan Government, such a shift has not occurred. Revanchist forces in the country and abroad, such as the opposition in parliament, Armenian Diaspora communities in the US, France, and Russia, as well as Karabakh Armenians, do not want to accept the nation’s defeat in the Second Karabakh War and are opposed to any peace treaty.
Nevertheless, in 2024, some positive developments were observed in the negotiation process. The establishment of a direct bilateral negotiation format between Azerbaijan and Armenia is one feature of this phase. This format underscores the importance of a continued direct dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia and allows the parties to achieve tangible results on key issues without traditional intermediaries.
The joint statement by the Administration of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, publicized on December 7, 2023, was a significant achievement of the bilateral format in 2023. According to this document, 32 Armenian and 2 Azerbaijani servicemen were released, and Armenia withdrew its candidacy to host the 29th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP-29) in favor of Azerbaijan’s bid. At the same time, Azerbaijan supported Armenia’s candidacy for membership of the COP Bureau.
However, it should also be considered that other events of 2024 showed that specific forces in Armenia and other foreign countries had attempted to politicize the COP-29 process to get concessions from Azerbaijan. Their activities included demands to sign an unfinished draft of the peace agreement (incomplete due to the inability of the parties to agree on all articles) and for the release of the individuals accused concerning the crimes committed against Azerbaijan and its people: some from the Armenian state and its Armed Forces, and others from the so-called ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’ established in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan and its illegal armed groups, among them A. Harutyunyan, A. Ghukasyan, B. Sahakyan, D. Babayan, D. Ishkhanyan, R. Vardanyan and others.
Azerbaijan rejected both demands. It insisted that the draft “Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia” will be signed only after the finalization of all 17 articles. It also refused to release the individuals accused of crimes committed against peace and humanity and war crimes, including waging an aggressive war and other unlawful acts committed against the Republic of Azerbaijan and its people. An open trial began hearing the criminal case against these people on January 17, 2025, in Azerbaijan.[2]
Despite these challenges, the above-mentioned joint statement created favorable conditions for advancing the peace agenda in 2024.
Towards Finalizing a Peace Agreement
High-level meetings of the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Nikol Pashinyan and Ilham Aliyev, continued in 2024. On February 17, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev held a joint meeting with Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at the initiative of the German Chancellor on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference.[3] On October 24, an unscheduled meeting was convened between Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders on the sidelines of the 16th BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. They discussed progress on bilateral issues, including the peace treaty, border delimitation and demarcation, and other matters of mutual interest. The countries’ foreign ministers, Jeyhun Bayramov and Ararat Mirzoyan, were also tasked with completing work on the draft “Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia.”[4]
Incidentally, both foreign ministers and their delegations met several times in 2024. For example, they were hosted by German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock in Berlin on February 28–29. These talks followed the above-mentioned meeting between German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.[5]
In addition, foreign ministers met in Almaty on May 10–11, 2024, and discussed the articles of the draft peace agreement. They agreed to continue negotiations on the open issues, where differences still exist.[6] Two meetings were also initiated by U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and held in the USA in July and September 2024.
Thus, according to a recent statement by Jeyhun Bayramov, there have been ongoing contacts with Armenia in several directions in the post-conflict period. Regular meetings have been held, mainly on the draft peace agreement, and ongoing contacts have been maintained between those meetings. So far, the preamble of the draft peace treaty and 15 out of 17 articles have been agreed upon by the parties. Only two have not yet been fully agreed. At the same time, in addition to the text of the peace agreement, the Azerbaijani foreign minister also mentioned that there is another serious issue that is related to “the ongoing territorial claims against Azerbaijan in the Constitution of Armenia, as well as in a number of normative legal acts. We expect serious and practical steps to be taken by Armenia in this direction.”[7]
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, in an interview with Dmitry Kiselev, Director General of the Rossiya Segodnya international news agency,[8] touched upon these two unresolved articles of the draft peace agreement. He noted that one of them is about refraining from filing international lawsuits against each other, which from his perspective is a mutually acceptable article. The second concerns the non-deployment of representatives of other countries on the Armenian–Azerbaijani state border. It should be mentioned that, on February 20, 2023, the EU Mission in Armenia was formally launched, with an initial mandate of two years with the possibility of extension, and this unsurprisingly caused concern in Azerbaijan.
President Aliyev also underlined two conditions that the Armenian side should address. The first concerns the Armenian Constitution, which includes a reference to the Declaration of Independence that contains territorial claims against Azerbaijan. The former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region is declared part of Armenia in this declaration. Therefore, President Aliyev clarified that changing the constitution is not an Azerbaijani whim but an objective requirement. He also proposed the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group. This institution has not been functional for a long time but still formally exists. The President noted that “Armenia’s reluctance to dissolve it and to join us in requesting its dissolution from the OSCE indicates that the plans of the revanchists are quite serious.” When these two unresolved articles of the draft peace agreement and the two conditions are agreed upon by the parties, there will be no further hurdles to signing the peace agreement.[9]
Highlights of the Delimitation Process
So far, eleven meetings of the State Commission on the Delimitation of the State Border between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Commission on the Delimitation of the State Border and Border Security between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been held by the Deputy Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, Shahin Mustafayev, and the Deputy Prime Minister of Armenia, Mher Grigoryan. Most of them took place on the border between the two states. Five were held in 2024: on January 31, March 7, April 19, May 15, and November 1.
Significant steps toward a lasting peace in the region were achieved during the eighth and ninth meetings, held on April 19 and May 15, respectively.
On April 19, the parties discussed the process of delimitation of the border and agreed to base the delimitation process on the Almaty Declaration of 1991. In accordance with the April 19, 2024, protocol established at the eighth meeting, the commissions completed the process of agreeing the regulations on their joint work.
As a result of this meeting, Armenia agreed to return four Azerbaijani villages of the Gazakh district (Ashagi Eskipara, Baghanis Ayrum, Kheirimly, and Gizilhajili) near the countries’ shared border. These were taken over by the Armenian armed forces in the early 1990s and their ethnic Azerbaijani residents fled from their homes or were expelled. Azerbaijan had demanded the return of these villages since the end of the Second Karabakh War.
The ninth meeting took place on May 15, 2024. According to the protocol signed during this meeting, the northernmost segment of the border, specifically between Azerbaijan’s Gazakh district and Armenia’s Tavush region, was determined. It said that this borderline passes between the villages of Baganis (Armenia)–Baganis Ayrim (Azerbaijan); Voskepar (Armenia)–Ashagi Askipara (Azerbaijan); Kirants (Armenia)–Kheyrimli (Azerbaijan); and Berkaber (Armenia)–Gizilhajili (Azerbaijan).[10] Thus, as of May 6, 2024, 40 border pillars have been installed on the Armenian–Azerbaijani state border.
Furthermore, on August 30, 2024, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed the “Regulation on the Joint Activities of the State Commission for the Demarcation of the State Border between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Commission on the Demarcation of the State Border and Border Security Issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan.”
After the approval of this document by the Armenian government in early September, and a positive review from the Constitutional Court, the Armenian Parliament ratified it on October 23, 2024.[11] Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed the bill into law, ratifying the regulation, on October 24.[12]
At the same time, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a decree on October 25, 2024, approving the “Regulation on the Joint Activities of the State Commission for the Demarcation of the State Border between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Commission on the Demarcation of the State Border and Border Security Issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan.”[13]
This was an outstanding achievement—a legal document signed by the two states for the first time. It was also remarkable that this document was prepared through direct bilateral negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. As a result of this work, this 12.7 km section of the state border was mutually recognized by both parties in 2024.
Concluding Remarks
The year 2024 has brought some positive results regarding normalizing relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.Significant progress has been made in the negotiation process toward finalizing a draft peace agreement, with only two unresolved issues remaining out of 17 articles. Today, seemingly, the main issue is whether or not the Armenian government is ready to take a risk and make bold political decisions. It has to abandon its territorial claims against Azerbaijan and recognize Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh once and for all. For that purpose, it should remove from the country’s constitution and other normative acts the articles containing territorial claims against Azerbaijan as well as supporting the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group. Armenia and Azerbaijan can also refrain from international lawsuits on a mutual basis and not deploy representatives of other countries along their shared border.
In addition, the work of delimitation of borders should be continued in the future. In fact, on January 16, 2025, during the 11th meeting of the State Commission on the Delimitation of the State Border between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia and the Commission on the Matters of Delimitation of the State Border and Border Security between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, it was agreed “to initiate comprehensive delimitation work from the northern section—starting at the tri-junction point of the borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Armenia, and Georgia—and proceed southward to the border of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Republic of Armenia with the Islamic Republic of Iran.”[14]
In contrast, the militarization of Armenia is a quite disturbing issue. The Azerbaijani President touched upon this in his address on the occasion of the Day of Solidarity of World Azerbaijanis and the New Year. He said, in particular, that Armenia is not capable of competing with Azerbaijan in the military or any other field.[15] He added that, taking into account Armenia’s massive militarization, Azerbaijan has significantly increased its military budget, which has reached a record level of 8.4 billion manats ($5 billion) for 2025. President Aliyev also touched upon this issue during his recent interview to the local media[16] and noted that
“Arming Armenia will only lead to new tensions, and we do not want that. We want peace. We want to close the chapter on war. However, we see that both Armenia itself and its new patrons do not share this goal. They are driven by ideas of revenge, and Armenia has become a source of threat to the region”. He emphasized that Armenian leadership should make the right decision because Azerbaijan is not a source of danger for them. Azerbaijan seeks peace and cooperation in the South Caucasus and Armenia should not act as a geographical barrier between Türkiye and Azerbaijan.
[9] Ilham Aliyev was interviewed by Dmitry Kiselev.