From the End of the Soviet Union to the War in Ukraine: Russia's Decline in Central Asia

10.58867/HTOE7424

In 2021, the five Central Asian states - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of their independence. None of these countries initiated or took part in the disintegration of the USSR, but all took advantage of the historic implosion of the Soviet system to proclaim their own independence. What remains of Russian influence in Central Asia after three decades of national, even nationalist, identity politics and  autonomous foreign policies struggling to find a place in the concert of nations, and at a time when Russia is bogged down in the war in Ukraine? To answer this question, we need to analyse the direction of Russian policy in Central Asia since 1991, focusing on the last decade and more particularly on the two years of war in Ukraine.

We shall start by surveying relations between Russia and each country in the region. We will then examine the trends in Russian policy in the region in terms of the economy, security, soft power and politics and governance. We will see that the Central Asian countries' dependence on Russia is diminishing in all areas, despite Moscow's explicit attempts to maintain its influence, and that this decline of Russian influence in Asia has been accelerated by the war in Ukraine. In fact, Russia's aggression against Ukraine has reinforced the ambitions of the Central Asian states for an emancipation allowing them to pursue a multi-faceted foreign policy open to new partners such as China and, to a lesser extent, Turkey.

Russia’s Main Priorities in Central Asia 

To maintain its influence in Central Asia, Moscow invests in all realms: the economy, politics, culture and, above all, the military. Its means are many and varied, ranging from intimidation and cooperation to a soft power policy, which is not always fully appreciated in the West. So how do these various cooperative efforts fit together?

In the economic sphere, the break-up of the USSR precipitated the collapse of trade between Russia and Central Asia. It was not until the early 2000s that it resumed, in the wake of Putin's drive to revitalise the energy sector, leading to a strong presence of Russian companies in Central Asian markets. Since then, several bilateral trade agreements have been signed to confirm these links, but above all to provide a solid economic foundation for the regional integration project. Moscow's real intention is to subjugate these states once again economically in order to strengthen its levers of action and interference in their domestic and foreign policy.[1]  

Has this objective been achieved? Partially, in that Russia has succeeded in setting up the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which includes two Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and perhaps soon Tajikistan. However, the current functioning of the EEU, limited to import tariffs, does not reflect the success of Russian influence, since its members have refused to cede their sovereignty to new supranational institutions. As it stands, the EEU has primarily benefited the Russian economy, which has a larger share of trade. This is because the competition for the EEU is fierce on the Chinese side. Russia lost its monopoly on the energy export routes of the Central Asian states in the early 2000s. Natural gas and oil from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are exported directly to China. Since 2019, China has become the leading economic partner of all Central Asian countries. Russia has only one remaining link and real economic lever with Central Asia, and that is labour. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular need the foreign currency repatriated by their workers in Russia, and this accounts for nearly a third of their GDP.[2]

Security and military concerns are an obsessive motivation for Russia's involvement in Central Asia. Its southern border is extraordinarily vast, and the Central Asian buffer zone is fragile and can be affected by disturbances in Afghanistan. This is why Moscow invests in maintaining and strengthening military links with the states in the region in two ways. Firstly, by strengthening regional cooperation through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (to which Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan belong), and then, in parallel, by forging military links with each country through bilateral agreements. It also relies on its military bases, of which there are three in Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, it has the Baikonur cosmodrome; in Kyrgyzstan, a military base in the town of Kant; and in Tajikistan it still has the 201^st motorised division, which guards the border with Afghanistan. It also participates in the military training of the national armed forces and, of course, supplies most of their weapons. It also regularly conducts joint military exercises with its Central Asian partners. The return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in 2021 enabled Russia to make this defence policy more acceptable to the states of the region, which fear political and social destabilisation from the south just as much as the Russians do.

And yet, despite Russian efforts and the openness of Central Asian countries to military cooperation with Russia, Moscow's security objectives are not without their challenges and difficulties. Problematic security issues persist. In 2010, for example, Russia rejected a request from the interim government of Kyrgyzstan to send a peace-making force to the south of the country to defuse ethnic unrest that left thousands of dead. Again, in the spring of 2021 deadly clashes on the border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan left Russia on the sidelines. Finally, territorial disputes between some of its member states make it difficult for the CSTO military alliance to function.

Moreover, although Russia remains the region's main external security partner, China and, to some extent, Turkey are steadily nibbling away Russian influence in this area. Both have become major arms exporters to the region and train future officers from these countries in their military academies. 

In the realm of ideas, Russian influence, rooted in Central Asian societies for several generations, is considerable. Russian language and culture permeate local societies, just as institutions and elites remain modelled and organised on the Russian and Soviet model. These reminders of a shared past are more prevalent in the major cities. At the 1989 census, shortly before the collapse of the USSR, there were almost ten million ethnic Russians in Central Asia. However, this Russian-speaking population is rapidly diminishing and remains significant only in Kazakhstan, where Russians still make up 20 percent of the population. Russian media and universities still exert an influence in Central Asia and it remains the leading host country for Central Asian students. And like many countries, Russia has adopted a soft power policy, bolstering the spread of the Russian language and culture throughout the world.[3] How this is received in Central Asia is difficult to estimate.  On the one hand, the elites continue to function in Russian and to orient themselves towards Russia, but at the same time they are not slackening in their efforts to pursue identity, linguistic and educational policies that will emancipate them from this Russian influence. Almost all countries have abandoned the Cyrillic alphabet in favour of the Latin alphabet. School textbooks have been replaced and parliamentary debates are now held in the national language.

Finally, Russia's importance in Central Asia in the field of politics and state governance is considerable, and this area is also high on Moscow's agenda. When Putin came to power in 2000, Russia promoted its model of authoritarian governance in Central Asia and served as a reference for Central Asian regimes in the name of the fight against the various ‘threats’ of extremist Islamism and Western interference. These countries, like Russia, maintain a cult of strong power, the only way to guarantee security and solid institutions, and this enables Russia to maintain solid political links with the countries of the region. Moscow's support has often been vital for all the authoritarian rulers of Central Asia, who have turned to it to protect themselves against ‘colour revolutions’ and maintain their hold on power by force. This political authoritarianism clashes with the new economic elites, who aspire to greater openness and autonomy in order to prosper in complete freedom.

So, for the last three decades, relations between Russia and Central Asia have evolved in fits and starts, as interests converge or diverge, and are influenced by the weight of history and Russian political and strategic habits. It was against this backdrop of the relative erosion of Russian influence that Russia's invasion of Ukraine constituted a first real break with the past. 

The main Trends of Russian policy in Each Central Asian Country  

The contemporary states of Central Asia are the heirs of the nation-states created from scratch by the Soviet Union between 1924 and 1936, on the basis of a vast multi-ethnic territory conquered by the Tsarist Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The domination of the Russian language and, to a certain extent, Russian culture was established over this long period. Until the disintegration of the USSR, national consciousness was weak, crushed by the Soviet supranational identity. In fact, in the referendum of March 1991, a very large majority of Central Asian people voted to remain part of the USSR. Forced to embrace the de facto independence that had been granted, the new Central Asian regimes had no choice but to assert themselves against the Russian ‘big brother’ and to cultivate anti-colonial sentiment to build a new national identity. However, Russia was still incontrovertibly there, and very quickly induced national leaders to moderate anti-Russian sentiment. Today, public opinion in Central Asia remains generally favourable towards Russia, while more circumspect about China and even the United States.[4]

Russia's foreign policy objectives towards the newly independent states of Central Asia evolved from a clear lack of interest in the early 1990s to a tactic of strategic integration over the next two decades. In 1991 Russia perceived these states as a burden and an obstacle to Russian modernisation. However, the imperial reflex was soon rekindled by the Kozyrev doctrine, according to which, in order to remain a great power, Russia had to maintain its influence in its former imperial space. Over the next two decades, Russia created a number of multilateral institutions, foremost among them the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) for military cooperation, and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which was supposed to federate the former Soviet field of influence into a new bloc to confront the West. However, with each country jealous of its independence, alongside its policy of regional integration, Russia has cultivated bilateral relations in order to forge closer ties with each while showing respect for their sovereignty. What have been the main trends in Russian policy towards each of these countries?

The relationship is closest with Kazakhstan (20 million inhabitants, 20 percent of whom are Russians, 2,724,900 square kilometres), and the nearest to an equal partnership.[5] The two countries share a 7,000-kilometre border, near which live most of the Russian minority, albeit declining in numbers. In the 1990s and 2000s, good Russian-Kazakh relations took the form of various cooperation projects with Russia, while Kazakhstan also sought to forge strong links with the rest of the world, including the West. Kazakh leaders allowed Russian influence to erode as they prioritised other regional and international partnerships. In domestic policy, concrete measures were taken to reduce Russian influence. For example, the Kazakh language was given preferential treatment and school textbooks were shaped to serve the new Kazakh national ideology. However, since 2000, and particularly since the annexation of Crimea, Putin's ambitions have forced Astana to adopt a more measured approach towards Moscow. 

In Kyrgyzstan (6 million inhabitants, 5 percent of whom are Russians, 200,000 square kilometres), relations with Moscow have been highly unstable and irregular due to the many crises and “colour revolutions” that have shaken the country.[6]In 2005 and 2010, popular uprisings overthrew the then powers, exciting concern and suspicion in Moscow, fearful for its own security. This chronic fragility of power in Bishkek was a lever for Russia. It warranted a greater Russian military presence to ensure regional security and increased the country's dependence on Moscow, but it also brought challenges in the form of increased migration and drug trafficking into Russia. The ethnic unrest between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in May 2010 in the city of Osh, and more recently the open war between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in April 2021, made it harder for Moscow to relaunch a policy of integration under its own leadership. Furthermore, the presence of a growing number of Kyrgyz workers in Russia fostered their interdependence. Indeed, while the Kyrgyz economy survives to a large extent on their repatriated earnings, Russia itself needed their cheap labour.

Tajikistan (10 million inhabitants, 1 percent of whom are Russians, 143,000 square kilometres) is the only country in Central Asia to have experienced a violent civil war, between 1992 and 1997, the effects of which are still eating away at its society and institutions.[7] In fact, the current president, Emomali Rahmon is supported by Russia and has fostered links, particularly in terms of military and security cooperation. Russian border guards and the 201^st motorised division are still based in Tajikistan. This force was reorganised into a Russian base in 2004, in accordance with the bilateral agreement in force until 2042. For Moscow, the Russian military presence is justified by the dangerous porosity of the border with Afghanistan in terms of threats and trafficking. However, relations have suffered from President Rahmon's mistrust of Russia's level of involvement with its Central Asian allies. In addition to security ties, there are also economic issues, which are increasingly being challenged by China.

Turkmenistan (6 million inhabitants, 4 percent of whom are Russians, 491,000 square kilometres) remains the most isolated and one of the poorest countries in the post-Soviet sphere. In line with its doctrine of positive neutrality adopted in 1995 and recognised by the United Nations, Ashgabat has avoided all Russian-led regional organisations, largely preferring bilateral relations. These, however, have evolved. After a period of tension in the 1990s, Turkmenistan became economically dependent on Russia in the 2000s as a result of a treaty granting Russia the exclusive export route for Turkmen gas. The opening of a new pipeline to China in 2009 has since put a damper on the deal.

Russia's relations with Uzbekistan (37 million inhabitants, 5 percent of whom are Russians, 449,000 square kilometres) have been the most variable. In the 1990s, Tashkent rejected all offers of Russian integration and sought to emancipate itself from Moscow's tutelage. By deciding to forge a strategic alliance with the United States and welcoming American troops to Khanabad after 9/11 in 2001, Uzbekistan browsed in the American sphere of influence, but the change of course was short-lived. In 2005, Tashkent returned to the bosom of Moscow when, in the wake of a popular uprising in the city of Andijan, the regime's bloody repression and authoritarian drift were strongly denounced by Washington. However, the rapprochement with Moscow was not enough to win Tashkent over to the structures sponsored by Russia, such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. The adoption of a new, less isolationist foreign policy in 2016, following the death of President Islam Karimov and his replacement by Shavkat Mirzoev, has brought a certain balance to Tashkent's engagements with international and regional powers. Its primary objective is to anchor the country to the global economy. And indeed, of all the countries in Central Asia, Uzbekistan is the one that, thanks to its size, population and strong identity based on a rich and attractive historical heritage, has been most able to diversify its policies and partnerships to become less dependent on Russia.

How is the War in Ukraine Disrupting Russian Policy in Central Asia?

Russia's invasion of Ukraine did not begin in February 2022 with the arrival of Russian troops on Ukrainian soil, but in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea by troops linked to Moscow. For Central Asian states, these two moments represented both a major regional challenge and an economic and political opportunity not to be missed.[8]  This challenge took the form of a threat and a warning regarding Russian imperialist ambitions, renewed by a Putin regime nostalgic for Greater Russia. At the same time, Russia's relative isolation on the international economic and financial stage as a result of Western sanctions is benefiting these countries, which have become hubs for circumventing sanctions in order to supply the war effort. Most importantly, the geopolitical value of Central Asia has been enhanced, because with Russia focussed on its western flank, and now dependent on these countries for its supplies, competitors - China, Turkey, the West - are flocking in and courting the southern margins of its former area of influence. These general remarks must be qualified, however, as the realities vary so much between countries.

Kazakhstan, for example, is the only country to share a direct border with Russia and is home to a large Russian minority, which Moscow can potentially manipulate for neo-imperial purposes. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan earn their living from the remittance of wages from workers in Russia and depend on Moscow for their security, especially Tajikistan, which borders the turbulent Afghanistan of the Taliban. These vulnerabilities mean that these states are walking a tightrope and have little leverage to defend their interests against Moscow. For example, no state has officially supported Russia's aggression in Ukraine, or recognised Moscow's annexation of Crimea or the independence of the pseudo-people's republics of Donbass.  Tending towards neutrality at the United Nations, the Central Asian states abstained or did not take part in the vote condemning Russia, which constitutes a form of repudiation of Russian policy. Nor did they join the Western economic sanctions against Moscow, in what many see as a new cold war between Russia and the West.

The war has had both positive and negative effects on the states and societies of Central Asia. Economies remain dependent on Russia, but the dynamics that were set in motion before the invasion of Ukraine and encouraged by Russia's unprecedented dependence on Central Asian markets have been accelerated, particularly in foreign policy. For all these countries, Russia remains their first or second economic partner, not only through trade in goods but also through migration and the importation of cheap labour from these former Soviet republics. It is estimated that more than 4 million Central Asians work legally in Russia. As we have seen, countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, among the poorest in the world, derive a third of their GDP from this repatriated income. Western sanctions against Russia have weighed heavily on these countries. Initially, some workers returned home or went elsewhere, creating new migratory routes to Turkey, South Korea and Eastern Europe. Today, however, these Central Asian workers are returning in force to Russia to compensate for the mobilisation of Russian workers at the front. At the same time, economic ties have been strengthened by the sanctions imposed by the West against Moscow. In order to obtain supplies, particularly equipment for the war effort, Russia circumvents the sanctions by using markets in Central Asia and the Caucasus to import goods from European and other countries that have voted in favour of sanctions.

The Ukrainian conflict is also helping to maintain and even strengthen the authoritarian dynamic in Central Asia. In fact, just as Moscow is bearing down on dissident voices, the Central Asian regimes are muzzling and repressing the slightest public expression against the war. Individuals have been arrested and questioned even in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, where the opposition enjoys relative tolerance. Similarly, the Central Asian states are under Russia's influence when it comes to legislation against foreign ‘agents’. For example, on 2 April 2024 Kyrgyzstan adopted a law modelled on Russian legislation. Implemented with little resistance, it provided for a number of measures aimed at identifying, registering, monitoring and suspending any organisation receiving foreign funding, which is the case for most of the independent media in Kyrgyzstan. This development is all the more worrying given that the country was one of the most pluralist and open in the region. 

Finally, the most unexpected effect of the war in Ukraine has been an exodus of Russian exiles flocking to the capitals of Central Asia. Motivated by personal concerns, avoidance of conscription or political indignation, they have found refuge in Central Asia. Because they are still largely Russian-speaking, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan offer a framework for the social reintegration of tens or even hundreds of thousands of refugees, and this has had an impact on the host societies. In Kazakhstan, these relokatny, or ‘relocated’ as they are known in Russian, have been perceived in certain Kazakh circles as a threat to the country's demographic balance. At the time of independence, the two ethnic groups each accounted for 37% of the total population, but thirty years of identity politics have favoured the growth of the titular ethnic group, which now is in a majority of almost 75 percent. However, the influx of Russian exiles could call these nationalist advances into question, especially in the north of the country and in a political context where Putin presents himself as the defender of Russians abroad.

As far as the geopolitical impact of the war is concerned, it is important to understand that from the point of view of the Central Asian capitals, the war diminishes the value of Russia, traditionally a provider of security and stability, as a partner power. The failure of the lightning strike initially envisaged by Putin, has created a breach in Russia's perceived military invincibility. Moscow no longer inspires the confidence that it once enjoyed among its ‘vassals’.  And the mistrust is all the more real since Russia is partially stripping its military base on the Tajik-Afghan border in order to increase its manpower on the Ukrainian front. For Central Asians, this shows that Russia attaches more importance to its war against Ukraine, a former Soviet Union country, than to defending its partners in Central Asia. 

The geopolitical effect of Russia's war in Ukraine is that Moscow's attention has been diverted to the west, whetting the appetite of competing forces for the countries of Central Asia. Despite being on relatively good terms with Russia, China is taking advantage of the war to strengthen its presence in the region,[9]  and going beyond economics, China's relations with Central Asia have expanded to include more political and military cooperation. At the first summit between China and the five Central Asian states, held in May 2023, China asserted itself as a leading political partner for the region, and in military terms clearly expressed its intention to act as guarantor of Kazakhstan's independence and territorial integrity. The announcement may have reassured Astana, but it has also irritated Moscow. This is not a matter of mere words: China has a military base in Tajikistan about which little is known, but which could in time be used as a lever to put pressure on Moscow.

Turkey too seems to have taken advantage of this relative easing of Russian pressure to strengthen its position in Central Asia. Indeed, the Organisation of Turkic States, a project for integration between Turkic-speaking states that Ankara has championed since the end of the USSR and which has had mixed results since then, is exciting renewed interest in this new geopolitical context.[10] In fact, the Russian stalemate in Ukraine, and the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, which marks a step backwards for Russia, has reinforced Türkiye's role in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In the aftermath of Azerbaijan's victory in Karabakh, with the Turkish ally playing a decisive role, the two powerful Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, have signed strategic partnership agreements with it. Türkiye, which has become an arms exporter in recent years, is also finding new outlets in Central Asia as well as providing training for military officers. In a first for the country, Türkiye is manufacturing combat drones in a joint venture with Kazakhstan.

In conclusion, it should be noted that over the long term, Russia's decline in Central Asia is confirmed. But this decline is not linear, and can change depending on the country and the context. But the general trend is that most of the countries of Central Asia are benefiting from the emergence of an implicit multipolar international system which enables all medium-sized countries, here as elsewhere, to assert themselves more effectively on an international stage that is no longer the preserve of the international powers.

Moreover, Russia's war in Ukraine is a major event, a turning point in the relationship between Russia and its former ‘sister republics’. Although Russia was known to be aggressive and belligerent, as its intervention in Georgia had already shown, its action in Ukraine revealed even more clearly that it is a dangerous power. Russia's vulnerability as a result of its stalemate in Ukraine is also forcing Moscow to show more consideration for its partners in Central Asia. In this way, the war in Ukraine is helping the Central Asian states to strengthen their position vis-à-vis Russia and in the eyes of most countries, particularly in the West, which wants to contain Russian expansionism in Europe and elsewhere.