Ideological Consolidation and Political Shifting in the Middle East Post-October 7: Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Israel

10.58867/LCQS5173

This article explores two macro developments that have persisted in the Middle East region following October 7. The first is ideological consolidation. In the post-Arab Spring period, processes of managing social mobilization, reforming state content and scope, and constructing nation-bound national identities have risen across the region. While this trend appears to have become institutionalized in countries like Israel, it remains in the construction phase in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Syria. The events of October 7 have not weakened this tendency; rather, they have consolidated it. The primary reason for this is the absence of societal-level demand for conditioning the state to transnational collaborations. 

The second significant development is the political shifts occurring in Iran and Syria. In Syria, the HTS-centered military mobility has overthrown the long-standing Assad family rule centered on the Baath Party. In the case of Iran, the strategy of proxies, which was initiated in the 2000s with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, has been rendered obsolete due to the recent attacks on Israel and the shift in power within Syria, as witnessed by the transition to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. The article's findings indicate that these developments have led to a fundamental transformation of the critical geopolitical landscape of Middle Eastern states, including Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Israel. 

This transformation is evident in three crucial dimensions. First, there has been a marked shift away from transnational ideological movements toward state-centric/territorial nationalism. Second, there is an evident increase in the importance of domestic legitimacy over regional alliances. Finally, a new regional order is suggested in which state sovereignty and national interests take precedence over historical ideological alignments. The implications of these changes are particularly significant for regional stability and international relations. Consolidating state-centric nationalism in these key geopolitical actors suggests a potential reconfiguration of regional power dynamics. This new configuration may lead to more predictable interstate relations based on national interests rather than ideological affiliations. However, it may also introduce new challenges in terms of managing regional competition and cooperation.

Furthermore, these developments indicate a broader historical shift in the Middle East's political landscape. The simultaneous weakening of transnational movements and strengthening of state-centric nationalism points to a fundamental reorganization of political authority and legitimacy in the region. This transformation can have long-lasting effects on regional security architecture, economic cooperation, and diplomatic relations in the following decades.

Syria: The Decline of Arab Nationalism and the Rise of Territorial Jihadism and Nationalism

The Syrian Arab Republic's trajectory during the 2011 Arab Spring upheavals represents a critical case study in the intersection of authoritarian resilience, sectarian mobilization, and state transformation.[1] The roots of this complex dynamic lie in the Assad regime's hegemonic control, established through Hafez al-Assad's "Corrective Movement" of 1970, which constructed a sophisticated system of neo-patrimonial governance that integrated military, intelligence, and economic networks under Alawite predominance.[2] While this system demonstrated remarkable durability, its fundamental contradictions became increasingly pronounced during Bashar al-Assad's presidency, ultimately contributing to the crisis that emerged in 2011.[3]

The relationship between state authority and civil society in Syria underwent several critical transformations during the Assad regime's consolidation of power. The Muslim Brotherhood's Hama uprising of 1982, culminating in the regime's devastating military response, established an enduring precedent for the state's approach to Islamic opposition movements.[4] This violent confrontation crystallized the perception among Sunni opposition groups that governance by the Alawite minority represented not merely political exclusion but systematic sectarian marginalization. In response to this challenge, the regime developed a sophisticated strategy of selective incorporation of Sunni economic elites while maintaining strict control over religious institutions and political expression.

Bashar al-Assad's succession to power in 2000 initially generated expectations of political liberalization, most notably manifested in the brief "Damascus Spring" period.[5] However, the regime's subsequent retrenchment revealed the fundamental structural limitations of reform within Syria's entrenched authoritarian framework. The systematic erosion of political institutions, particularly the Ba'ath Party's historical capacity to mediate between state and society, created a governance vacuum that neither formal political processes nor informal patronage networks could adequately address.

The confluence of institutional deterioration and profound societal alienation created the structural conditions from which the 2011 mobilization emerged. This movement represented a qualitative departure from previous challenges to regime authority, as the initial protests transcended entrenched sectarian and regional cleavages, articulating an unprecedented, unified demand for systemic political reconstruction. The regime's calculated response strategy, oscillating between selective concessions and systematic repression, precipitated a fundamental transformation in the nature of contentious politics, catalyzing the shift from civil resistance to armed insurgency.[6]

This transformation of the domestic conflict landscape created opportunities for external intervention, as the trajectory of the Syrian conflict became increasingly determined by regional geopolitical dynamics, particularly through the strategic interventions of Iran, Türkiye, and the Gulf states. The internationalization of the crisis introduced multilayered complexities, as external actors pursued divergent strategic objectives through an intricate network of local proxies. This transformation of the conflict environment created conditions conducive to the emergence of jihadi-salafist groups, whose organizational sophistication and doctrinal coherence provided distinct operational advantages in mobilizing both material resources and ideological supporters within the fragmented landscape of civil war.[7]

Syria's evolving political landscape reveals several theoretical insights regarding contemporary state and conflict dynamics:

First, it demonstrates how authoritarian systems can maintain stability through repression while undermining their long-term viability through the interaction of institutional decay and sectarian politics. Second, the failure of moderate opposition forces highlights the challenges of maintaining a cohesive political movement in the face of state violence and external intervention. Third, the rise of extremist groups shows how civil conflict can create conditions that favor actors with specific organizational and ideological characteristics, even if their appeal remains limited.

The Syrian experience is also an important reminder of traditional democratization theory's limitations in explaining political transitions in deeply divided societies. The complex interplay of institutional legacies, sectarian dynamics, and international interests that can shape conflict trajectories is not considered by the assumption that popular mobilization naturally leads to democratic outcomes.

Furthermore, the Syrian case demonstrates how state capacity can rapidly degrade when traditional mechanisms of control and cooptation fail to adapt to changing societal demands. While the regime's reliance on increasingly narrow networks of support has effectively maintained control in the short term, it has ultimately contributed to the broader fragmentation of state authority and social cohesion.

The final days of 2024 signify a pivotal shift in the contemporary political landscape of the Middle East, as military operations spearheaded by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) effectively brought an end to the Assad dynasty's five-decade long dominance over Syria.[8] This shift does not merely signify a transition in political leadership; it denotes an unprecedented rupture in the ideological underpinnings that have historically structured Syrian politics since the post-Cold War era.

It is essential to contextualize the Assad regime's collapse within the broader historical trajectory of post-colonial state formation in the Middle East. During the Cold War, the Arab world witnessed the rise of unique ideological movements, and the emergence of political elites aligned with the era's geopolitical imperatives. One of these ideological frameworks is Pan-Arabism, an ideology that began in Egypt and became dominant in the region during the period of state formation. This ideology took shape through two principal political vehicles, which are as follows: Nasserism and the Ba'ath Party. Despite undergoing ideological metamorphosis, these movements demonstrated remarkable institutional resilience. Following the dissolution of analogous personalistic regimes in Iraq and Libya, Syria under Bashar al-Assad emerged as the final bastion of institutionalized Pan-Arabist ideology in the region.

The durability of Assad's regime during the post-2011 period was due to three interconnected pillars: the inherited political infrastructure and bureaucratic apparatus, and the geopolitical alignments that his father bequeathed. Assad's unyielding response to popular mobilization and unequivocal rejection of constitutional reform served as pivotal catalysts for the opposition's ideological radicalization, eventually leading to a profound reshaping of Syria's political landscape.

The ongoing political transformation in Syria, orchestrated by the militant group known as HTS (Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham) under the leadership of Ahmed al-Shara, signifies a multifaceted undertaking in the realm of post-authoritarian state reconstruction. The "Interim Government" seems to be undertaking a deliberate effort to redefine the concept of nationalism, aiming to foster a sense of unity and belonging within the diverse societal fabric of Syria. This process involves navigating the delicate balance of domestic and foreign relations, considering the external linkages of various constituencies.

Ahmed Al Shara’s ideological evolution represents a significant transformation in political consciousness within the context of late 20th and early 21st-century Middle Eastern politics. His early familial environment, characterized by adherence to modernist Arab political traditions—specifically Nasserism, Arab nationalism, and democratic reformism—stood in marked contrast to his later embrace of global jihadist ideology. This transformation was catalyzed by two pivotal historical events: the Palestinian Intifada and the September 11, 2001, attacks, which served as critical junctures in his ideological reorientation.[9] His trajectory exemplifies a broader pattern observed among certain regional political actors during this period, characterized by a shift from secular pan-Arab nationalist orientations toward religious-political frameworks. This biographical detail provides insight into the complex interplay between local and global events in shaping individual political consciousness, illuminating broader ideological transformation patterns in the modern Middle East.

This transformation occurs within a broader regional context characterized by evolving political arrangements and security architectures. While the Arab Spring's initial momentum accelerated but subsequently constrained the Muslim Brotherhood's political aspirations, various regional actors, particularly the Gulf Arab states, pursued domestic reform initiatives and novel interstate alignments.[10] The Abraham Accords, facilitated by United States diplomacy, exemplify this trend toward pragmatic cooperation between Israel and select Arab states, notably the UAE and Bahrain.

At this juncture, two fundamental dynamics appear to be shaping the policies of Syria's new administration. The first is the decline of Pan-Arabism coupled with the rise of Syrian nationalism, while the second involves efforts to align with the growing hegemony of Gulf states in the region. A key political practice observed in HTS and Al-Shara's governance of Idlib has been the shift from constructing foreign policy around broader Arab interests and agendas to pursuing a Syria-centric foreign policy approach.[11] Now, Al-Shara's core policy capacity hinges on how it will navigate challenges amid complex social dynamics and intertwined foreign policy interests. The path to maintaining cohesion among the country's diverse religious, ethnic, and cultural groups is unlikely to be resolved through a Baathist-style secularism. This is primarily because the Salafi-jihadist activism experienced in Syria over the past two decades necessitates either integration or management within newly established institutions. Such a challenge can potentially be overcome not through constructing a secularism-centered national identity, but rather through a Syrian identity characterized by national and religious fluidity, driven by a technocratic elite with enhanced administrative capabilities.

Israel: The Consolidation of Right-Wing Populism and the Decline of Establishment Elites

The October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israeli southern border settlements has precipitated a significant crisis of political legitimacy within Israel's governance structure.[12] This event represents one of the most challenging political trials for the Likud party and its leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, who has maintained executive power since 2009.[13] This development occurred within an already polarized political environment, characterized by contentious judicial reform debates that had created deep societal cleavages over issues including the limitation of Supreme Court powers, the reduction of government advisory roles, and judicial selection processes.[14]

These political contestations can be understood as contemporary manifestations of Israel's longstanding identity politics discourse. Since the state's inception, the ambiguity surrounding definitions of Israeli and Jewish identity has given political actors considerable latitude in implementing new political strategies.[15] This dichotomy is evident in how different political factions conceptualize Israeli identity: centrist and left-wing parties advocate for a cosmopolitan, democratic, and liberal value system[16], while right-wing and religious parties emphasize localized, nationalist, and exclusivist identity constructions.[17]

Netanyahu's distinctive political capital lies in his capacity to synthesize and represent Israel's right wing's political, social, and cultural values. His political methodology was significantly influenced by his observations of 1990s American politics, where he studied the intersection of law-and-order rhetoric, religious-nationalist synthesis, and media-savvy leadership.[18] Netanyahu's subsequent attempt to transpose these political phenomena into the Israeli context was facilitated by the outbreak of the Second Intifada in the 2000s and the decline of traditional right-wing leadership structures.[19]

Netanyahu's political opportunism effectively capitalized on security crises, elite deterioration, and economic contraction. His security doctrine prioritized counterterrorism strategies over Palestinian negotiations, while his economic approach favored market liberalization over Israel's historically statist economic model.[20] His response to elite deterioration manifested in revisionist domestic policies that challenged established institutional paradigms. According to Leslie, Netanyahu's leadership since 2009 exemplifies populist governance that has moved Israel significantly rightward through three key mechanisms.[21] These include his "moralistic imagination of politics" that positions Israel as holding absolute moral authority, his maintenance of "permanent crisis politics" through constant invocation of existential threats, and his practice of "discriminatory legalism" that selectively applies legal standards to benefit allies while constraining opponents. Through these populist tactics, Leslie argues that Netanyahu has fundamentally shaped Israeli foreign policy and its global position - an approach that, while initially viewed as diplomatically isolating, has proven politically successful domestically and increasingly aligned with global populist trends.

The impact of the October 7 attack on Netanyahu's political trajectory and broader Israeli politics requires historical contextualization. Historically, security crises have often strengthened right-wing political forces in Israel, as evidenced by the decline of leftist governance following the 1967 War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The establishment of Likud in 1973 and its electoral victory in 1977 exemplify the symbiotic relationship between security concerns and right-wing political ascendancy.[22] Menachem Begin's legacy, characterized by security hawkishness, alliance-building with peripheral identities, and engagement with messianic right-wing elements, established political precedents that Netanyahu would later inherit and expand upon.

Netanyahu's 1993 assumption of Likud leadership marked a significant evolution in right-wing Israeli politics. He transformed Likud into a centralized, ideologically driven political organization emphasizing leadership loyalty.[23]Through centralized primary elections, he diminished the influence of traditional party elites. His political methodology, distinct from his predecessor, Yitzhak Shamir, embraced social media engagement, direct voter communication, and pragmatic leadership strategies.

The October 7 attack initially appeared to threaten Netanyahu's security-centered political narrative. Early polling suggested potential electoral gains for centrist figures like Benny Gantz. However, Netanyahu's subsequent military response in Gaza, expansion of conflict parameters regarding Lebanon, operations against Hezbollah, and targeted eliminations of Hamas leadership have reinvigorated public support for his administration.

The resilience of Netanyahu's political authority has significant implications across Israel's political spectrum. The attack has prompted a fundamental reassessment of Israeli security doctrine among security elites and heightened political elites' concerns about public accountability. The response from different societal segments has been notably partisan: right-wing media frames the October 7 events as an extension of anti-Netanyahu conspiracies, while left-wing outlets attribute direct responsibility to Netanyahu's governance. These divergent narratives reflect and reinforce existing ideological divisions, particularly evident in ongoing judicial reform debates.

The erosion of democratic institutions during Netanyahu's administration has catalyzed a significant transformation in Israel's governance structure, marked by a shift from domestic to international oversight mechanisms.[24] This institutional metamorphosis, characterized by the diminishing authority of internal democratic safeguards such as the judiciary and civil service, has paradoxically resulted in the emergence of external regulatory bodies as de facto supervisors of Israeli governance.[25] The U.S. Treasury Department, European Union, and credit rating agencies have assumed increasingly prominent regulatory roles through economic pressure, while international courts have gained heightened significance amid the perceived weakening of Israel's domestic judicial system.[26]

The government's institutional reform initiatives, particularly Justice Minister Yariv Levin's judicial revision program, have generated substantial costs across economic, diplomatic, and security domains, with Netanyahu's prioritization of political survival over institutional reform—evidenced by his resistance to establishing a state commission of inquiry into security failures and his pattern of appointing political allies—leading to inadequate responses to these challenges.[27]The cumulative effect demonstrates what political scientists’ term "institutional displacement," where attempts to consolidate domestic control have ironically resulted in increased international oversight and diminished sovereign autonomy, creating a "regulatory boomerang effect" that challenges traditional concepts of state sovereignty and suggests the emergence of new forms of international governance in response to domestic democratic deterioration.

Netanyahu's political resilience in Israel presents a compelling case study in institutional constraints and leadership durability during crisis periods. Despite significant military setbacks and public criticism, his coalition has maintained power through several key mechanisms illuminating broader political survival theories under institutional stress.[28] The structural impediments facing the opposition, particularly regarding conscription law and budget negotiations, have proven insufficient to destabilize his government. At the same time, Netanyahu's demonstrated expertise in coalition management—especially his handling of relationships with ultra-Orthodox parties—has provided crucial political flexibility. His approach to the conscription law exemplifies this dynamic: although subject to judicial review, it serves the immediate political purpose of coalition maintenance. The international dimension further reinforces Netanyahu's position, as external pressures, including from traditional allies like the United States, have proven ineffective in substantially altering his policy trajectory. The opposition's fragmentation and inability to present a unified alternative further strengthens Netanyahu's position, echoing patterns from the 2022 election cycle. This situation provides a theoretical case study in how institutional arrangements, when combined with strategic coalition management and opposition weakness, can enable political survival even in the face of significant governance failures, challenging conventional assumptions about political accountability in democratic systems.[29]

Another crucial aspect of Netanyahu's political strategy centers on establishing demographic supremacy in favor of the Jewish population in Israel. Making the country attractive to new Jewish immigrants has become a paramount concern in achieving this objective. This demographic imperative has driven specific economic policies, including privatization initiatives, the reduction of regulatory oversight mechanisms, and the implementation of low taxation regimes. Netanyahu perceives Israel's development as a center of attraction not merely in terms of economic benefits but as a fundamental component of national security strategy.[30] This interweaving of demographic objectives with economic and security considerations has facilitated Netanyahu's broader coalition-building strategy. He has successfully constructed political alliances with all components of the Israeli right within the margins of power. These alliance strategies have ultimately rendered Netanyahu's leadership unique and strengthened the Likud Party's political influence among the electorate. The process demonstrates a particular pattern: smaller parties that align with Netanyahu typically experience a gradual erosion of their influence, ultimately losing their voter base to Likud and Netanyahu's leadership. This consolidation of power reflects Netanyahu's ability to transform temporary political alliances into permanent shifts in voter loyalty.[31]

The regional dimension of Netanyahu's strategy further reinforces this domestic political consolidation. The elimination of regional actors that could pose national security threats to Israel (including the Assad regime in Syria, Hamas in Gaza, and Hezbollah in Lebanon) serves a dual purpose: it addresses security concerns while simultaneously strengthening the position of current political actors and their ideological framework. This symbiotic relationship between regional security operations and domestic political consolidation suggests the potential continuation of Likud Party's power under Netanyahu's centralized leadership. However, the emerging phenomenon highlights a more complex reality: the new populist right coalition in Israel is being strengthened across demographic, geopolitical, and political dimensions.

Saudi Arabia: The First Test of Saudi Nationalism

In examining contemporary Middle Eastern politics and geopolitics, Saudi Arabia emerges as a uniquely positioned regional hegemon. The kingdom's geopolitical position is shaped by two fundamental factors: its vast natural resources and its central role in the Arab-Islamic world. Saudi Arabia's status as custodian of Islam's holiest sites, combined with its pivotal position in regional culture and economics, establishes it as a crucial actor in Middle Eastern interstate relations and transnational religious networks.

This strategic position proved instrumental in shaping Arab politics during the Cold War era. Following World War II, as U.S. hegemony in the Middle East solidified and the USSR sought regional allies, Saudi Arabia leveraged religious identity to counter Soviet influence. The kingdom's strategy of promoting Islamic consciousness to combat "atheist" communist ideologies led to an initial alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, primarily driven by the new state's need for educated personnel. However, this collaboration inadvertently catalyzed the emergence of local Islamic political and intellectual movements, pushing Saudi society toward greater conservatism and compelling the monarchy to adopt more religiously oriented governance. This state-supported conservatism would transform significantly with King Salman's ascension to power in 2015.

As Dazi-Héni observes, this transformation marked a fundamental shift in Saudi Arabia's political trajectory. Under King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's leadership, the long-standing power-sharing arrangement between the royal family and religious establishment was systematically dismantled. The Crown Prince's calculated "non-violent palace coup" in June 2017 represented the culmination of this process, as he consolidated his authority by marginalizing religious leaders and assuming direct control over the Public Investment Fund, thereby fundamentally restructuring both political and economic governance mechanisms.[32]

The significance of this transformation extends far beyond a mere leadership transition. The inauguration of Vision 2030 during King Salman's tenure signifies a profound reinterpretation of state-society relations in Saudi Arabia. This comprehensive strategy can be regarded as an emerging social contract that diverges from the state's conventionally restrictive approach to public life. The expansion of the public sphere, particularly benefiting women, youth, and the middle class, and with state-sponsored entertainment initiatives, reflects this shift. Moreover, the rise of a new Saudi nationalism, promulgated through extensive media networks, has begun to profoundly reshape public discourse. Contemporary challenges, such as the Yemen conflict and tensions with Iran, are increasingly framed through the lens of national interest rather than religious or sectarian divisions. While the initial reforms were initiated under King Abdullah, the implementation and acceleration of these reforms have been distinctly shaped by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's leadership and his embedded technocratic elites.

The restructuring of Saudi institutions has precipitated a significant shift in foreign policy orientation, moving from an ummahist ideology toward a more nationalistic "Saudi Arabia First" stance. This transformation in foreign policy is concomitant with broader changes in societal values, thereby enabling decision-makers to pursue previously unthinkable policy initiatives. As articulated in his interview with Fox News, the Crown Prince's expressed openness to establishing diplomatic relations with Israel exemplifies this new paradigm, wherein national interests take precedence over traditional religious and ideological considerations. As Dazi-Héni observes, the Crown Prince's strategy to re-establish his legitimacy encompassed two key dimensions: positioning himself at the core of the family institution and seeking popular legitimacy among youth through Vision 2030 and nationalist discourse.[33]

As Alhussein observes, the emergence of Saudi hyper-nationalism represents a fundamental transformation marked by three critical shifts in the Kingdom's sociopolitical framework. First, there has been a strategic restructuring of state-society relations, characterized by the displacement of religious authority as the primary source of legitimacy in favor of a state-centric nationalist narrative. This transformation is particularly significant given Saudi Arabia's historical role as the custodian of Islam's holiest sites and the long-standing alliance between the House of Saud and the Wahhabi religious establishment dating back to 1744. Second, the mobilization of nationalism serves as a mechanism for maintaining social control while Mohammed bin Salman implements his Vision 2030 reforms. The state effectively weaponizes social media platforms, particularly Twitter, to promote nationalist sentiments through what has been termed "emoji loyalty," while simultaneously suppressing dissenting voices through legal mechanisms such as the 2017 counter-terrorism law. Third, this new nationalism has manifested in an increasingly assertive foreign policy doctrine, exemplified by the "Saudi First" approach. This represents a departure from the Kingdom's traditional role as a regional mediator and guardian of pan-Islamic interests toward a more unilateral pursuit of national interests, as demonstrated by interventions in Yemen and the blockade of Qatar.[34]

Okruhlik explains that Saudi Arabia's political transformation reveals shifting dynamics between civil society, religious authority, and state power. She emphasizes that traditional legitimacy sources—military conquest, Wahhabism, and oil revenues—are being restructured through civil society actors and nationalist discourse, with civil Islam mediating between state authoritarianism and religious extremism. Her framework shows how traditional patronage relationships are evolving into a new social contract based on civil participation and nationalism, illuminating broader patterns of change in transforming authoritarian states.[35]

The consolidation of Prince Mohammed bin Salman's political authority in Saudi Arabia correlates temporally with the declining operational capacity of transnational jihadist networks, which had historically constituted both an internal security crisis and a global security threat. The institutional presence of Al-Qaeda across the Arab geographical space during the period spanning 1979-2006, particularly exemplified by the devastating 2006 terrorist operation resulting in 300 fatalities, precipitated unprecedented strategic challenges for Saudi Arabia's political elite.[36] This historical juncture necessitated a fundamental reconfiguration of state-society relations and security apparatus within the Kingdom, ultimately contributing to the conditions that facilitated the emergence of the current political order.[37]

This period marked a critical inflection point in Saudi domestic politics, as the traditional mechanisms of state legitimacy and social control required substantial adaptation to address these emerging security dynamics. The transformation of these security challenges ultimately contributed to creating the political conditions that enabled the subsequent consolidation of centralized authority under the current leadership.[38]

This fundamental restructuring of state authority and legitimacy laid the groundwork for an even more profound transformation of Saudi national identity. As analyzed by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies analyzes that the transformation of Saudi Arabia's national identity under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman represents a pivotal shift from traditional Salafi-Wahhabi legitimacy toward a state-centric nationalism focused on economic modernization and social reform through Vision 2030.[39] While this "Saudi First" approach attempts to transcend historical commitments to pan-Arabism and political Islam in favor of domestic development, the Gaza conflict has exposed the inherent tensions in this nationalist reorientation. The disconnect between official discourse criticizing Palestinian actions and widespread public sympathy for Gaza reveals the challenges of maintaining an exclusively nationalist agenda in a region where transnational religious and cultural bonds remain influential. This tension exemplifies the broader complexities of constructing nationalist identities in the contemporary Middle East while balancing modernization imperatives with persistent transnational loyalties.[40]

Conclusion Remarks

This article examines the structural transformation of Middle Eastern politics following Israel's military escalation across multiple fronts - Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran - in the aftermath of October 7, 2023. The analysis posits that these developments have catalyzed fundamental shifts in regional power dynamics and ideological configurations. The primary empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis manifests in two parallel processes: the erosion of traditional Pan-Arabist political structures and the reconfiguring of regional elite networks.

The most significant indicator of this transformation is the dissolution of the Assad regime's governance in Syria. This political system had maintained hegemony through the Baath Party's institutional framework from the 1970s until 2024. This political rupture coincides with the diminishing influence of Iran's resistance axis network, encompassing strategic actors such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the former Assad regime in Syria, Ansarullah in Yemen, and Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq.

The weakening of Iran's capacity to coordinate and mobilize its proxy forces has accelerated the consolidation of distinct ideological paradigms that emerged during the post-Arab Spring period. These emerging political formations include: the technocratic-authoritarian model of Saudi nationalism, exemplified by Prince Mohammed bin Salman's Vision 2030 initiative; the entrenchment of right-wing populist nationalism in Israel under Benjamin Netanyahu's leadership; and the evolution of the Salafi-jihadist movement in Syria, which exhibits a complex ideological synthesis incorporating elements of territorial jihadism, nationalist rhetoric, and technocratic governance.

This analysis suggests that the concurrent processes of political realignment centered on Iran's shifting regional position and ideological consolidation manifesting in Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Israel will fundamentally reshape state-society relations and elite configurations across the Middle East in the immediate future.