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Global business ecosystems are no longer shaped solely by efficiency or scale—but by their capacity to endure and adapt under sustained challenge. Over the past five years, pandemic shocks, geopolitical conflict, and energy volatility have forced firms to confront the fragility of tightly optimized systems. This article explores how adaptive governance—flexible decision-making structures, integrated learning loops, and rapid cross-functional collaboration—has emerged as a critical capability. Using Türkiye’s role as a regional anchor and its evolving partnership with U.S. businesses, the analysis illustrates how spatial diversification, digital agility, and agile public–private coordination can collectively turn systemic shocks into long-term strategic capacity.

 

Crises as a Turning Point for Business Leadership

The COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical conflict delivered a “double exogenous shock” that rattled global output, trade, and investment more severely than any event since the Second World War. Global merchandise-trade volumes fell by 5.3 percent in 2020, rebounded unevenly with 9.7 percent growth in 2021, and then slowed to 2.7 percent growth in 2022as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sent energy and commodity prices soaring. [1] These crises showed how quickly finely tuned, just-in-time supply networks can seize up when borders close or commodity prices spike. Traditional, command-and-control hierarchies—optimized for efficiency in stable conditions—proved slow to detect weak signals and reallocate resources. A McKinsey survey of large enterprises found that only 21 percent had contingency structures capable of making material decisions within forty-eight hours during the first pandemic wave.[2]

In response, a growing cohort of firms adopted what the World Economic Forum terms adaptive governance—a configuration that privileges decentralized decision rights, continuous learning loops, and real-time data flows.[3]Adaptive organizations establish “nerve-center” teams that cut across functional silos, run rapid after-action reviews, and iterate standard operating procedures on the fly. These attributes correlate with superior financial performance: companies scoring highest on McKinsey’s “strategic resilience” index out-performed peers by 50 percent in total shareholder return between 2020 and 2022.[4] Case-comparison evidence from manufacturing plants in Poland, Mexico, and Türkiye indicates that factories with autonomous shift-level decision rights restored pre-shock overall-equipment-effectiveness two to three times faster than centrally controlled counterparts.[5]

Resilience is now a competitive differentiator rather than an optional add-on. According to Jo Taylor, investors increasingly reward boards that can demonstrate credible shock-absorption capacity alongside conventional profitability metrics.[6]Consulting evidence from wartime Ukraine reinforces the point: firms that empowered local managers while maintaining central oversight restored pre-war output up to three times faster than those that kept authority tightly held.[7]

At the macro level, governments now compete to brand themselves as stable platforms for production, logistics, and shared-services hubs. Türkiye’s location at the intersection of European, Middle Eastern, and Caucasian corridors—together with accelerated digital-infrastructure investment since 2018—enabled several multinationals to reroute regional operations through İstanbul and Kocaeli during both the pandemic and the Black Sea conflict. Such cases illustrate a widening metric of competitiveness: not cost minimization alone, but the speed with which firms and host economies can pivot, partner, and lead amid systemic volatility.

 

 

Rethinking Global Operations: Near-shoring, Friend-shoring, and Strategic Dependence

The past five years have fundamentally altered the logic of global production networks. Between Q1-2020 and Q2-2022, average container-freight rates rose by almost 20 percent, while governments introduced more than 400 export-restrictive measures, disrupting flows of semiconductors, fertilizers, and other critical inputs.[8] Confronted with such volatility, many firms accelerated near-shoring (to shorten physical distance) and friend-shoring (to situate capacity in politically aligned jurisdictions). Corroborating this shift, the OECD reports that intra-regional trade in parts and components among member economies was expanding at twice the global pace by late-2022.[9]

Relocation alone, however, rarely suffices. Without diversified suppliers, redundant transport corridors, and decision loops that can pivot in real time, identical vulnerabilities re-emerge under new coordinates. The World Economic Forum’s Risk-Proof matrix flags any single-country share above 65 percent in a critical input as a governance red light, irrespective of whether the country is “near” or “friendly.” Hence mature resilience programs begin with a risk-first diagnostic—mapping exposure, stress-testing fallback plans, and embedding flexibility into everyday decision structures.

Türkiye as a Composite Spatial Node

Türkiye allows companies to pursue near- and friend-shoring simultaneously. Istanbul sits within a four-hour flight radius of economies whose combined GDP exceeds US $46 trillion, while Turkish Airlines operates 342 direct routes to 131 countries.[10] Yet distance is only half the story. 

Report from the AmCham Türkiye Regional Hub Initiative highlight eight additional pillars—an OECD-scale manufacturing base, and a deep pool of multilingual engineers—that convert raw geography into operational depth.[11]On the hardware side Türkiye fields fifty-six commercial airports, 28 546 km of dual carriageway and 1 213 km of high-speed rail, tying Europe-to-Caspian corridors into a single network.[12] Incentives complement those assets: customs-free zones, bilateral investment-treaty protection and a zero-corporate-tax regime for export-oriented financial-service entities until 2031.

Türkiye’s institutional agility surfaced early in the pandemic. Unlike many regional peers that imposed blanket plant closures, Ankara opted for weekend-only curfews in the manufacturing sector: production lines paused after the Friday night shift and restarted Monday morning. [13]The result was the loss of just one shift per week—an interruption that could be absorbed through modest overtime rather than full-scale shutdowns. [14] AmCham members reported that several Türkiye-based facilities maintained uninterrupted output during the spring 2020 surge, enabling temporary production shifts from Central Europe and the Gulf. These relocations—though often ad hoc—highlighted Türkiye’s advantage in resilience, skilled labor, and partial-lockdown policies at a time when many neighboring regions were fully shut down.

During the COVID-19 first wave, Türkiye’s partial-lockdown strategy allowed many export-oriented factories to remain operational while several neighboring countries enforced full shutdowns. Recognizing Türkiye’s growing role in regional operations, AmCham Türkiye established a “Regional Hub” Sub-Group in May 2022 to help quantify and accelerate this momentum.

According to an internal Q4-2024 AmCham survey (29 out of 70 corporate members responded), one in four respondents already coordinate at least one multi-country function from Türkiye, while another 30 percent are actively exploring such moves.

Respondents and company interviews pointed to four key motivators behind Türkiye’s regional appeal:

  Rank  

Surveyed motivator

Illustrative slide evidence

1

  Strategic geography & air-connectivity  

“4-hour flight to markets worth USD 46 trn; 342 direct flights”

2

Cost-efficient, skilled workforce

“Young, skilled and sizeable labour pool; flexibility & multilingual capability”

3

Incentives & regulatory clarity

  “Zero corporate tax for IFC entities; export-revenue deductions; simplified dispute-resolution rules”  

4

Robust physical & digital infrastructure

“Dual carriageways, high-speed rail, data centers”

 

Infrastructure can attract investment—but human capital sustains it. AmCham Türkiye supported the Global Turks Par Excellence study[15], which surveyed over 3,000 Turkish professionals abroad and identified three dominant leadership traits: responsiveness, ambiguity tolerance, and speed of execution. In AmCham’s survey, 62 percent of firms cited “local crisis-responsive leadership” as a primary reason for regionalization—outpacing even tax incentives.

 

Toward a Layered Model of Resilience

Spatial realignment is necessary but insufficient. Deloitte’s interviews with firms operating in wartime Ukraine show that companies combining multi-hub footprints with diversified suppliers and redundant transport nodes restarted operations 40 per cent faster than those with centralized dependencies. [16] The evidence aligns with the WEF threshold: concentration—whether geographic, vendor, or data—above 65 per cent signals excess vulnerability. Türkiye’s case illustrates one way to assemble the required layers, but the underlying design logic is transferable: jurisdictions that can offer location, infrastructure, policy reflex, and agile talent become natural anchors in resilient value chains.

 

Digital Agility and Institutional Transformation

The pandemic did not invent the digital imperative, but it compressed what would otherwise have been a decade-long transition into a matter of months. Firms that had already embedded real-time data flows and delegated decision rights to cross-functional teams were demonstrably better prepared: in a Bain study of global manufacturers, companies running digital “nerve-centers” restored 90 per cent of baseline output within three weeks of the first lockdowns; peers without such architectures needed more than eight.[17]  

From Dashboards to “Nerve-Center Governance”

Digital resilience goes beyond installing dashboards. Leading firms created nerve centers—small, cross-functional units that cut across IT, operations, risk, and legal, empowered to reprogram supply-chain parameters or launch new customer journeys within hours. The World Economic Forum frames these hubs as “sensor-effectors”: they pull granular telemetry from factory lines, ports, and customer apps, then push coded responses—rerouted freight, repriced inventory, re-sequenced production—without waiting for weekly steering-committee meetings.[18] Such responsiveness shortens the “sense-and-pivot” cycle that underlies adaptive governance.

Regulatory Agility as a Co-Product

Digital agility delivers full value only when public institutions move at a compatible pace. Where licensing, customs, or data-protection rules can be interpreted and updated in real time, the private sector converts shocks into manageable variances rather than existential threats.  The OECD’s Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2025highlights Türkiye’s “single-window” e-customs platform example of regulation designed for rapid adjustment. [19] The Ministry of Industry and Technology circulated curfew notices through its e-notification system on Thursday evenings; factories updated rosters and port slots via API links within hours.[20]

Institutional Transformation Inside the Firm

Digital tools again are necessary but insufficient: governance structures must change in parallel. Effective nerve-center organizations flatten hierarchies, extend budgetary authority to analytics leads, and routinise “after-action reviews” that feed code and policy back into the next sprint. Deloitte’s wartime-Ukraine interviews suggest that firms with pre-defined digital escalation paths restored cross-border cash-flow visibility 40 per cent faster than those relying on manual reconciliation.[21]

Digital agility is therefore not an adjunct IT project; it is the institutional spine of adaptive governance. Companies that pair sensor-rich infrastructures with decentralized authority gain a structural advantage: they can observe anomalies, interpret them through multi-disciplinary teams, and respond before the shock metastasizes. Türkiye’s blend of pro-digital regulation, infrastructure scale, and agile managerial talent positions it as a laboratory where this next generation of governance is already being tested at commercial scale.

 

Türkiye–U.S. Business Continuity as Adaptive Public Governance

The Türkiye–U.S. commercial relationship has become a living example of adaptive public governance. As global shocks intensified, the bilateral trade and investment corridor not only held steady but gained strategic relevance. Between 2019 and 2022, U.S. exports to Türkiye grew by over 20 percent, while Turkish exports to the U.S. rose by 39 percent—marking the U.S. as Türkiye’s second largest export market in 2022. End of 2024, U.S. is Türkiye’s 2nd biggest export and 5th biggest import market. Türkiye-US bilateral trade volume has reached 32.6 billion dollars with 16.2 billion dollars import and 16.4 billion dollars export. When we include services, bilateral trade has reached 40 billion dollars.[22]

This adaptive posture has extended into more recent crises. Following the February 2023 earthquakes, Türkiye’s economic infrastructure faced enormous strain—especially in the southeast. In direct response, U.S. business community mobilized their expertise, capabilities, and community resources with a total dollar amount tracked as $112.14 million. to assist with the relief and recovery efforts following the earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria.[23]

Besides monetary support, there were in-kind donations, at the very first step, addressing urgent needs including construction vehicles, sheltering, food & water, hygiene Products, energy, digital support and medical care.  Volunteering efforts mainly aim to address long-term recovery projects such as education, employment, psychological support, children and youth, agriculture in the region.

These examples underscore Türkiye’s value not just as a geographic node, but as a governance partner: one capable of coordinating quickly across ministries, companies, and civil society to maintain continuity under duress. As tariff regimes shift and regional risks persist, the Türkiye–U.S. commercial ecosystem will likely continue to serve as a model for resilience-by-design.

 

Human Capital as Institutional Resilience

A rapidly growing body of crisis scholarship converges on the proposition that organizational recovery trajectories are mediated less by asset endowments than by behavioral and structural features of the workforce. Broadly, three mutually reinforcing mechanisms are evident.

  1. Decentralized decision-rights.
    A Harvard Business School panel of 200 firms finds that units in which frontline managers were authorized to redeploy labor or redirect inventory during the first COVID-19 wave generated 2.4-times more process innovations than units that awaited senior approval.[24]

  2. Role fluidity.
    Crisis-simulation studies conducted by Deloitte show that cross-trained production teams preserve overall-equipment-effectiveness 30–40 percent longer than siloed teams when supply, cyber, and climate shocks occur simultaneously.[25]

  3. Psychological safety and iterative learning.
    Organizations that institutionalize structured after-action reviews within 30 days of a disruption not only shorten time-to-stability but also raise their medium-term abnormal-return profile.[26]

Country-level labor-market surveys suggest that these attributes are not confined to any single geography. Middle-income exporters—e.g., Mexico, Türkiye, Poland, Malaysia—score comparatively high on behavioral “responsiveness indices”: managers are more willing to act on partial information and rotate between functions. Yet longitudinal data indicate that in-house investments—job-rotation “katas,” scenario drills, and empowerment charters—can cultivate the same capabilities in otherwise rigid labour markets. Hence, human-capital resilience is portable, designable, and measurable, rather than an exogenous national trait.

 

 

Public–Private Co-Governance for Systemic Resilience

Systemic shocks—pandemic, cyber intrusion, energy blockade—transcend firm and sector boundaries. Recent comparative analyses identify three governance layers that, when concurrently active, flatten restart curves across multiple crises.

Layer

Operational manifestation

Representative examples

Data fusion

Near-real-time sharing of risk telemetry between state and market actors

U.S. CISA joint cyber advisories; Singapore’s Port Call Optimization platform[27][28]

Adaptive regulation

Sub-statutory instruments that permit targeted, time-bound derogations

Brazil’s medical fast-track lanes; [29]Türkiye’s weekend-only factory curfews; [30]Kenya’s mobile-money KYC waivers[31]

Resource synchronisation

Pre-negotiated logistic, financial, or talent pools that can be mobilised cross-sector

EU “green lanes” for food transport; Japan’s semiconductor spare-parts pacts[32][33]

Empirical evidence from the World Economic Forum’s Resilience Consortium shows that firms embedded in jurisdictions possessing all three layers restored cash-flow visibility up to 40 percent faster during the Ukraine shock than those operating in purely transactional environments. The Consortium’s 2024 framework further argues that co-governance arenas must be institutionalized ex ante—that is, codified before crises hit—because ad-hoc task forces cannot usually acquire statutory authority or data connectivity on demand.

 

 

Closing Reflection: From Contingency Planning to Adaptive Design

This article has argued that global business resilience now rests on a tri-pillar architecture—spatial diversification, digital agility, and human-capital depth—embedded in formal arenas of public-private coordination. Empirical illustrations drawn from multiple regions, including but not limited to Türkiye, show that near- or friend-shoring is a necessary but insufficient condition: relocation of physical assets yields durable benefit only when paired with nerve-center governance, cross-skilled talent, and regulation capable of rapid, data-driven adjustment.

For scholars, the framework offers a portable research program: testing how different mixes of the three pillars interact with national institutional varieties and modelling their joint effect on restart curves and abnormal-return trajectories. For executives and policymakers, the message is direct: resilience is no longer an emergency add-on; it is a continuous design variable. Organizations—and jurisdictions—that internalize this logic stand to convert the turbulence of a poly-crisis era from an exogenous hazard into a consistent strategic advantage.

 

 


[1]International Monetary Fund, IMF Annual Report 2022: Crisis Upon Crisis (Washington, DC, 2022).

[2] Dago Diedrich et al., “Strategic Resilience During the COVID-19 Crisis,” McKinsey & Company (2 March 2021), https://www.mckinsey.com/strategy/strategic-resilience-during-the-covid-19-crisis.

[3] World Economic Forum, Risk Proof: A Framework for Building Organisational Resilience in an Uncertain Future (Geneva: WEF, 2022), 12, https://www.weforum.org/publications/risk-proof-a-framework-for-building-organizational-resilience-in-an-uncertain-future/.

[4] McKinsey & Company, Strategic Resilience Index—Dataset Supplement (2023 release), 7, https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights.

[5] Deloitte, Adaptive Enterprise Simulation Series: Composite Scenario Results (London: Deloitte, 2023), 7 – 9.

[6] Jo Taylor, “Resilience and Adaptability Are Key to Navigating Today’s World—Here’s Why,” World Economic Forum Agenda (14 January 2024), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/01/resilience-adaptability-key-navigating/.

[7] Deloitte, Unbreakable Defences: Lessons from Ukraine on Building Business Resilience During Wartime (London: Deloitte Perspectives, 23 October 2023), 9–10, https://www2.deloitte.com/ce/en/services/consulting-risk/perspectives/lessons-from-ukraine-on-building-business-resilience-during-wartime.html.

[8] International Monetary Fund, IMF Annual Report 2022: Crisis upon Crisis (Washington, DC: IMF, 2022), 15 – 18, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2022/.

[9] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Responsible Business Conduct Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine (Paris: OECD, 2023), 20 – 22, https://www.oecd.org/publications/responsible-business-conduct-implications-of-russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine_49d0ad80-en.htm.

[10] Turkish Airlines, 2025, https://www.turkishairlines.com/en-tr/flight-destinations/.

[11] AmCham Türkiye, Regional Hub Initiative: Briefing Deck (Istanbul, January 2024).

[12] Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Investment Office, “Incentives Guide” 2024, https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/investmentguide/pages/incentives-guide.aspx

[13] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, “Koronavirüs ile Mücadele Kapsamında Sokağa Çıkma Kısıtlamaları—Yeni Kısıtlama ve Tedbirler Genelgeleri,” General Communiqué, 2020. https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/koronavirus-ile-mucadele-kapsaminda-sokaga-cikma-kisitlamalari---yeni-kisitlama-ve-tedbirler-genelgeleri.

[14] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Industry and Technology, “6-19 Measures for Manufacturing Facilities” (6 April 2020).

[15] Invest in Türkiye (Podcast), “Empowering Turkish Professionals: Insights from Ayşegül Dicle Aydın on the Global Turks par ExcellenceProject,” 2023, https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/library/podcast/Pages/empowering-turkish-professionals-insights-from-aysegul-dicle-aydin-on-the-global-turks-par-excellence-project.aspx.

[16] Deloitte, wartime-Ukraine field interviews – source for the “40 percent faster restart” figure:
Deloitte, Unbreakable Defences: Lessons from Ukraine on Building Business Resilience during Wartime (London: Deloitte Perspectives, 23 Oct 2023), p. 9.

[17] Olaf Schatteman, Drew Woodhouse & Joe Terino, “Supply-Chain Lessons from COVID-19: Time to Refocus on Resilience,” Bain & Company Insight (27 April 2020), https://www.bain.com/insights/supply-chain-lessons-from-covid-19/.

[18] World Economic Forum, Risk Proof: A Framework for Building Organisational Resilience in an Uncertain Future (Geneva: WEF, 2022), 29–31.

[19] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Economic Surveys: Türkiye 2025 (Paris: OECD, 2025), 1 – 4, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/04/oecd-economic-surveys-turkiye-2025_fa62886d/d01c660f-en.pdf.

[20] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Industry and Technology, Circular No. 2020/14: “COVID-19 Measures for Manufacturing Facilities” (6 April 2020), annex 2, https://www.sanayi.gov.tr/assets/upload/duyurular/imalat-tesislerinde-covid-19-tedbirleri-genelgesi_06042020.pdf.

[21] Deloitte, Unbreakable Defences: Lessons from Ukraine on Building Business Resilience during Wartime (London: Deloitte Perspectives, 23 Oct 2023), 9-10, https://www2.deloitte.com/ce/en/services/consulting-risk/perspectives/lessons-from-ukraine-on-building-business-resilience-during-wartime.html.

[24] Harvard Business School, Empowering the Front Line in Crisis: Evidence from COVID-19, Working Paper 21-044 (2021), https://www.hbs.edu/ris/Publication%20Files/21-044_3c7b38a2-935d-4a17-9f6d-845f3f9b0660.pdf.

[25] Deloitte, Adaptive Enterprise Simulation Series: Composite Scenario Results (London: Deloitte, 2023), 7 – 9.

[26] McKinsey & Company, Post-Crisis Value-Capture Survey (2022).

[27] U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, “Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Archive,” accessed 22 May 2025, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories.

[28] Singapore Maritime and Port Authority, “Port-Call Optimisation Platform,” accessed 22 May 2025, https://www.mpa.gov.sg/who-we-are/port-call-optimisation.

[29] Brazil Ministry of Economy, Portaria ME No 158/2020: “Special Customs Fast-Track for Medical Goods” (29 Apr 2020), https://www.in.gov.br/en/web/dou/-/portaria-me-n-158-de-29-de-abril-de-2020-253490038.

[30] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, Koronavirüs ile Mücadele Kapsamında Sokağa Çıkma Kısıtlamaları—Yeni Kısıtlama ve Tedbirler Genelgeleri,” 2020 communiqué, https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/koronavirus-ile-mucadele-kapsaminda-sokaga-cikma-kisitlamalari---yeni-kisitlama-ve-tedbirler-genelgeleri.

[31] Central Bank of Kenya, “Emergency Measures to Facilitate Mobile-Money Transactions,” 16 Mar 2020, https://www.centralbank.go.ke/2020/03/16/emergency-measures-to-facilitate-mobile-money-transactions/.

[32] Nikkei Asia, “Japanese Chipmakers Team Up to Share Spare Parts, Keep Lines Running,” 19 Apr 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/Semiconductors/Japanese-chipmakers-team-up-to-share-spare-parts-keep-lines-running.

[33] European Commission, COVID-19: ‘Green Lanes’ to Keep Food and Medical Supplies Moving,” Press Release IP/20/510, 23 Mar 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_510.

CONTRIBUTOR
Emre Karter
Emre Karter

Emre Karter is the Chair of the American Chamber of Commerce in Türkiye.

Foreword The complex global challenges of our time increasingly intersect across domains once considered separate. Public health crises expose weaknesses in governance; security threats now emerge from both state and non-state actors; human rights are under strain in conflict zones and authoritarian settings; and migration continues to test national capacities and collective values. This special issue...
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